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No. 20050055-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KEVIN YARDLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

Brief of Respondent

Utah Department of Corrections ("Department") submits this brief in answer
to the Brief of Petitioner Kevin Yardley.

Statement of Jurisdiction
The Decision and Final Agency Action of the Career Service Review Board
(CSRB) was entered on December 23, 2004. R. 554-583. Kevin Yardley's Petition for
Judicial Review was filed on January 19,2005. This Court, generally, has jurisdiction
over such petitions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) and Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (West 2004). This Court is without jurisdiction over Yardley's
petition, as explained below, because the petitioner has failed to make the agency whose

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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decision he seeks to challenge a party to this proceeding.

Issues Presented
1.

Jurisdiction over final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings
Although Yardley seeks judicial review of the CSRB's decision, he has never

made the CSRB a party to this proceeding. The plain language of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act requires the agency whose final action is to be reviewed to
be named as a party. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to review the CSRB's decision?

A

Standard of review
"[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the

requested action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction
it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767
P.2d 569, 5/0 (Utah App. 1989).

S.

Preservation of issue
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, because they are threshold issues, may be

raised at any time and are addressed before resolving other claims. State v. Sun Surety
Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, ^ 7, 99 P.3d 818, 820. This issue is unique to the appeal and does
not call for a review of the CSRB's decision.

2
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2.

Reasonableness and rationality of CSRB's decision
CSRB made three separate conclusions challenged on appeal by Yardley. First,

CSRB determined that the Department did not act inconsistently with its prior practice in
terminating Yardley when he failed to make a prima facie showing of inconsistency.
Second, CSRB concluded that Yardley was afforded due process before his termination
because he was given notice of the allegations against him and an opportunity to be heard
at a pretermination hearing. Third, CSRB concluded that a prior warning given to
Yardley did not prevent the Department from terminating Yardley because the warning
did not address the prior, previously undiscovered misconduct for which Yardley was
terminated. Were CSRB's three conclusions nevertheless reasonable and rational?

A.

Standard of review
This Court reviews an agency's application of its own rules for reasonableness and

rationality, employing some, but not total, deference to the agency. Kent v. Dep't of
Employment Sec, 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Yardley stipulates to this
standard of review. Aplt. Brf. at 2.

B.

Preservation of issue
The CSRB made the above conclusions in its Decision and Final Agency Action

issued December 23, 2004. R. 563-77. Yardley filed his petion for review on January
19, 2005. Yardley has challenged all three of the CSRB's conclusions in his opening

brief.

3
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Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached as an Addendum to this Brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB that

upheld the Department's decision terminating Yardley's employment for sexual
misconduct.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
On November 5, 2001, Kevin Yardley was dismissed from his career service

position as a correctional officer with the Utah Department of Corrections (Department).
R. 367-69. The termination was based on Yardley's numerous acts of videotaped sexual
misconduct occurring both on and off duty. R. 367-69.
Yardley appealed his termination to the CSRB on November 20,2001. R. 6-7. An
evidentiary hearing on Yardley's grievance was conducted by a CSRB hearing officer on
April 2, 3, 4 and 23, 2003. R. 298-304, 322-23. In his August 21, 2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Decision, and Order, the hearing officer upheld the Department's
decision to terminate Yardley's employment. The Hearing Officer also found that the
termination of Yardley's employment was not excessive, disproportionate or otherwise an
abuse of discretion. R.429-41.
On August 29, 2003, Yardley filed his notice of appeal to the CSRB from the
hearing officer's decision. R. 445-46. After hearing Yardley's appeal,1 the CSRB issued
its Decision and Final Agency Action on December 23, 2004. R. 554-83. The CSRB

*The CSRB appeal hearing held April 20, 2004, is contained in the record in a
separately bound volume entitled "Administrative Appeal Hearing Before the Board."
This volume is not Bates-stamped, apparently because the transcript had not yet been
received by CSRB when the record was transmitted to this Court.
5
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sustained the hearing officer's findings and conclusions and affirmed the termination of
Yardley's employment.
Yardley filed his Petition for Review of Final Agency Action on January 19,2005.

3.

Disposition Below
By its decision dated December 23,2004, CSRB affirmed the termination of

Yardley's employment, concluding that the hearing officer's decision was reasonable and
rational and supported by substantial evidence. R. 577. CSRB agreed with the hearing
officer that the Department's decision to terminate Yardley's employment was supported
by substantial evidence, did not violate Yardley's due process rights, and was neither
disproportionate nor inconsistent with the Department's prior practice.

Statement of Facts
Before the termination of his employment, Yardley had been employed with the
Department for eleven years as a prison guard, a career service position. R. 354. Yardley
was assigned to a guard tower at the Central Utah Correctional Facility at the time his
employment was terminated.
On January 12, 2001, the Department issued an administrative complaint against
Yardley, alleging that: (1) Yardley videotaped himself and his wife in 1995 and 1998
having sexual intercourse, and that these videotapes were circulated to other Department
employees; and (2) that Yardley masturbated on at least one occasion while on duty in the
guard tower. R. 344-46. This complaint contained a warning: "You are hereby warned
that should this type of misconduct reoccur in the future, we will be forced to consider
6
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severe disciplinary sanctions, including termination." R. 345. Yardley did not contest
these allegations and on March 5, 2001, the Department ordered that Yardley be
suspended for fifteen days without pay. R. 347-49.
Three months later, in June of 2001, a husband of a Department employee
informed the Department that he had four sexually explicit videotapes of Yardley. The
four videos were copied onto one tape and given to the Department management. When
Department management viewed the videotape, it was immediately determined that the
misconduct depicted thereon was different from the conduct in the administrative
complaint of January 12, 2001. R. 299, at 81-82, 103-05.2 Prior to viewing the video
compilation, the Department was unaware of the degree of Yardley's sexual misconduct
portrayed on the video. R. 322, at 107-09. Jesse Gallegos, the Department's deputy
director, testified that he was "dumbfounded" when he viewed the videotape: "I couldn't
believe what I was seeing[,] it was much more than just a single act of masturbation."
R. 322, at 82. The video compilation showed numerous incidents of Yardley
masturbating on and off duty before the video camera using a variety of inanimate
objects, including Yardley masturbating in public places. R. 350-352. A more detailed
listing of these incidents appears below, in the summary of the amended administrative
complaint filed upon Yardley on July 9, 2001.
On June 14, 2001, the Department served Yardley with a second administrative
complaint. R. 353. This complaint stated an intent to terminate Yardley's employment
with the Department. The complaint was amended and served upon Yardley again on
July 9,2001. R. 350-52. The amended administrative complaint again stated an intent to
2

Because the individual volumes of the step 5 hearing are not Bates-stamped
except for the first page of each volume, this brief cites to the Bates-stamped number on
page one of the volume, followed by the page number of each volumes own pagination.
7
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terminate Yardley's employment, and included a detailed list of allegations of sexual
misconduct. R. 350-52. The amended complaint stated that the intent to impose
disciplinary action was based on different events from those for which Yardley had been
previously disciplined on March 5,2001.
The amended administrative complaint alleged that Yardley had engaged in
multiple videotaped incidents of masturbating while on duty in the guard tower and
multiple incidents of masturbating in public places while off duty. R. 350-52. In at least
six of the incidents portrayed on the video, Yardley displayed a sign around his neck with
his home and work phone numbers, inviting women to call him at home or work so he
could masturbate for them. R. 350-52. Yardley was naked in several incidents of
videotaped masturbation in the guard tower. R. 350-52. In three of the incidents,
Yardley masturbated with the names of women written on his penis, including the name
of a Department employee. R. 351. Several incidents showed Yardley viewing
pornography in the guard tower while on duty. R. 351. The amended complaint also
alleged that Yardley had disseminated at least one copy of a videotape portraying similar
events to those listed above to the spouse of a Department employee. R. 352.
Yardley received a pretermination hearing on August 9, 2001, before a Department
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). R. 384. At this hearing, Yardley called witnesses,
introduced documentary evidence, and made closing arguments. R. 384. Yardley was
also represented by counsel at the hearing. R. 384. Among other things, the Department
ALJ reviewed the following: Yardley's personnel file (R. 354); the prior discipline
imposed in March 2001 (R.354, f2); the mitigating effect of Yardley's positive
performance evaluations (R. 364); the aggravating factor of Yardley's status as a certified
officer (R. 364).
8
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At this pretermination hearing, Yardley did not contest the numerous allegations of
videotaped misconduct itemized in the amended administrative complaint of July 9, 2001.
R. 362. Yardley instead argued that the videotape portrayed misconduct for which he had
already been punished in the first administrative complaint. R. 362. The Department
ALJ accordingly found that all of the factual allegations in the amended complaint were
true. R. 362. The Department ALJ recommended that the Department terminate
Yardley's employment. R. 354-66, 384-85.
After reviewing the ALJ's recommendation, the Department's Executive Director,
Mike Chabries, terminated Yardley's employment in a Final Order entered November 5,
2001. R. 367-369.

Summary of Argument
This Court should dismiss Yardley's petition with prejudice because, under
UAPA, Yardley's failure to make CSRB a party to this action deprives this Court of
jurisdiction over this controversy. Although Yardley served his petition for review on
CSRB, he did not name CSRB as a party in this proceeding, did not list CSRB as an
additional non-captioned party in his brief as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), and
did not serve CSRB with a copy of his opening brief.
Even if this Court has jurisdiction over this controvery, the CSRB's decision
should be affirmed because it was reasonable and rational. The CSRB correctly upheld
Yardley's termination in all three aspects challenged by Yardley. First, CSRB correctly
determined that the Department did not act inconsistently with its prior practice in
terminating Yardley because he failed to make a prima facie showing of any
inconsistency. Second, CSRB correctly concluded that Yardley was not deprived of due
9
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process prior to his termination because he was given notice of the allegations against him
and an opportunity to be heard at a pretermination hearing. Third, CSRB correctly
concluded that a prior warning given to Yardley did not prevent the Department from
terminating Yardley because the prior warning did not address the prior, undiscovered
misconduct for which Yardley was terminated.

Argument

1.

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Yardley's petition
seeking judicial review of the CSRB's decision
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by

the court. Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 932 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1997). Absent
statutory authority to review the actions of an administrative agency, this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the agency action. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens,
Water Co.. 2001 UT App 173, f 13,27 P.3d 579. This Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this petition under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA").3
UAPA governs judicial review of the CSRB's administrative proceedings. UAPA
requires that the CSRB be named as a respondent in the present action. Although Yardley
served his petition for review on the CSRB, Yardley has not named the CSRB as a
respondent. Yardley has not identified CSRB as an additional non-captioned party, as

3

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -21 (West 2004).
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required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1). Yardley did not serve his opening brief upon
CSRB. The jurisdictional time limit to bring a petition for judicial review against the
CSRB has now passed. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to review the CSRB
decision and should summarily dismiss Yardley's petition with prejudice.
This Court has jurisdiction to review "all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l); see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a); Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 834 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah App. 1992).
To vest this Court with jurisdiction over a particular proceeding, however, a petitioner
must meet the requirements of section 63-46b-14. Subsection 14(3) contains two
requirements. First, the petition must be filed "within 30 days after the date that the order
constituting final agency action is issued." Section 63-46b-14(3)(a). See Viktron/Lika
Utah v. Labor Common, 2001 UT App 8, f7, 18 P.3d 519 (holding that failure to timely
file a petition for judicial review is a jurisdictional defect). Second, the petition "shall
name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents." Section 63-46b14(3)(b) (emphasis added).
In the context of this section, "agency" means the agency which entered the order
constituting final agency action. The only other use of agency mentioned in the section is
"final agency action" and "order constituting final agency action." No mention is made
of an agency which might have appeared as a party in the administrative proceeding.
Moreover, the reference in subsection 14(3)(b) to parties indicates that they shall be
named as respondents in addition to the agency whose decision is being appealed: "the
petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents."
(Emphasis added.) The conjunctive "and" indicates that the requirement to name parties
is separate from the requirement to name the agency. See State v. Maestas. 2002 UT 123,
11
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63 P.3d 621 (concluding that a statute was "written in the conjunctive, thus making clear
that it has two separate requirements"). Accordingly, Yardley should have named both
the Department and the CSRB as respondents.4
One purpose of the requirement to name the agency as respondent is to obtain
jurisdiction over the agency that conducted the adjudicative proceedings to be reviewed.
Without such jurisdiction, the reviewing court would be powerless to affirm, reverse,
remand, modify, or even vacate the agency action. See Ostler v. Buhler. 1999 UT 99, f7,
989 P.2d 1073 (noting that the court lacked jurisdiction to make ruling in favor of
nonparty); see also Openshaw v. Openshaw. 12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 1932) (holding that
"decree in favor of a person who is not a party to the action or proceeding is void because
the court has no jurisdiction to make it"). This Court should interpret the term "agency"
in subsection 14(3)(b) in a manner that is consistent with its purpose. See In re Kunz.
2004 UT 71, f 8, 99 P.3d 793 (holding court should interpret plain language of statute in
light of its purpose).
To interpret the requirement otherwise would render it meaningless or absurd in
many cases. Although one of the parties in this case happens to be an agency, many
administrative proceedings involve only private parties.5 In such cases, the requirement
4

See. e.g., Lunnen v. UDOT. 886 P.2d 70, 71 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (identifying as
respondents in a petition for judicial review both the CSRB and the agency which
appeared before the CSRB as a party); Kent v. CSRB, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(same); Holland v. CSRB. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same); Lopez v. CSRB.
834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same).
5

See. e.g.. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt. 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201 (judicial
review of administrative action of Labor Commission, which was named as respondent);
Gillevv.Blackstock. 2002 UT App. 414, 61 P.3d 305 (judicial review of administrative
action of Department of Public Safety, which was named as respondent); Longley v.
Leucadia Fin. Co.. 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762 (judicial review of administrative action of
state engineer, who was named as respondent).
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of naming the agency as a respondent would be meaningless unless it means the agency
whose final action is being challenged in the petition. See Hall v. Dep't of Corr., 2001
UT 34, f 15,24 P.3d 958 (holding court should avoid interpretations that will render
portions of a statute superfluous).
Similarly, although the petitioner here happens to be a private party, in other cases
the petitioner is an agency.6 In such cases, unless the term "agency" refers to the agency
whose final action is to be reviewed, subsection 14(3)(b) would require the petitioner to
name itself as a respondent. This Court should avoid an interpretation of section 63-46b14(3) that would lead to such an absurd result. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App
485, If 9, 515 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (declining to follow rigid interpretation of statute where
doing so would lead to absurd result).
By not naming the CSRB as a respondent, Yardley has thus failed to meet the
requirements of UAPA. More precisely, Yardley has failed to bring a petition against the
CSRB within thirty days from the date of the CSRB's final decision, as required by
section 63-46b-14(3). Yardley has thereby deprived this Court of jurisdiction.
Dicta from the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Harlev Davidson v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2005 UT 38, 116 P.3d 349, may at first blush appear
contrary to this jurisdictional argument. In Harlev Davidson, the Court stated that
"regardless of whether a party seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate court under

6

See, e.g.. State v. CSRB, 2004 UT App 171, 92 P.3d 776 (petition for judicial
review of CSRB decision filed by Department of Public Safety); Utah Dep't of Corr. v.
Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same filed by Utah Department of
Corrections).
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rule 3 or rule 14, the only jurisdictional requirement is the timely filing of the pleading
initiating appellate review." Id. at ^ 14.
Despite this sweeping statement in dicta, the holding in Harley Davidson did not
address jurisdictional errors perpetuated into the briefing stage of a case such as those
perpetuated by Yardley. In Harley Davidson, all of the petition's deficiencies were
corrected well before the case reached the briefing stage. Id. at f 5 (stating that the
deficiencies were corrected within three days of the initial filing of the petition). Here,
Yardley has not committed a mere pleading error at the outset of this case, but has
perpetuated into the briefing stage a basic misinterpretation of UAPA's jurisdictional
requirement to name the decision-making agency as a party. In addition to initially
failing to name CSRB as a party to his petition, Yardley has now failed to list CSRB as an
additional non-captioned party, as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), and failed to
serve his opening brief upon CSRB.7 Accordingly, the limited holding in Harley
Davidson does not apply in this case and the plain language requirement in UAPA does.
Harley Davidson is further inapplicable because the Court did not address two
important considerations present here when it stated that it could find "no principled
reason to treat agency petitions differently than other appeals." 2005 UT 38 at % 13.
First, unlike a lower court which is bound by an order of reversal, modification, or
remand because it is located within the hierarchy of the judicial branch of government, a
state agency such as CSRB is part of the executive branch of government and only comes
under a court's jurisdiction when properly joined as a party to a particular controversy.

7

Moreover, it appears that this Court does not consider CSRB to be a party, as
demonstrated by this Court's order of April 12, 2005, which was served upon Yardley
and the Department but not to CSRB.
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The Court in Harlev Davidson did not discuss this inherent difference between an agency
appeal and an appeal from a lower court.
Second, the right to judicial review of an agency decision is not a constitutional
right, but a limited right created by statute. See Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Golden
Gardens Water Co., 2001 UT App 173, f 13,27 P.3d 579. Absent statutory authority to
review the actions of an administrative agency, this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the agency action. kL Where the legislature has evinced its intent to impose filing
requirements, such as those in UAPA, upon a petition for judicial review, an appellate
court's review of those requirements should be made in the context of this limited right to
judicial review and not compared with the right to judicial review of a district court
decision.
Because neither of these principled reasons was before the Harlev Davidson Court,
it's pronouncements in that case are inapplicable here.

2.

The CSRB's decision was reasonable and rational
Even if this Court has jurisdiction here, the CSRB's decision should be affirmed

on the merits because it was reasonable and rational. The CSRB correctly upheld
Yardley's termination in all three aspects challenged by Yardley. First, CSRB correctly
determined that the Department did not act inconsistently with its prior practice in
terminating Yardley because he failed to make a prima facie showing of any
inconsistency. Second, CSRB correctly concluded that Yardley was not deprived of due
process before his termination because he was given notice of the allegations against him
15
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and an opportunity to be heard at a pretermination hearing. Third, CSRB correctly
concluded that a prior warning given to Yardley did not prevent the Department from
terminating Yardley because the prior warning did not refer to the prior, undiscovered
misconduct for which Yardley was terminated.
Discipline for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the
employing agency. Lucas v. Murray City Civ. Serv. Comm'n. 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Ut Ct.
App. 1997). CSRB review of an employing agency's personnel actions is a limited one.
Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439,443 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). By its own
rules, CSRB must first determine whether the factual findings of the step 5 CSRB hearing
officer are reasonable and rational under the substantial evidence standard. Utah Admin.
Code R. 137-l-22(4)(a) (2003). CSRB must next determine whether the step 5 hearing
officer correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes under the correctness
standard. Utah Admin. Code R. 137-l-22(4)(b) (2003). Finally, CSRB must determine
whether the step 5 decision is reasonable and rational based on the ultimate factual
findings and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah Admin.
CodeR. 137-l-22(4)(c).
Yardley concedes that the Department satisfied its initial burden of proving a
factual basis for the allegations. Aplt. Brf. at 30. Yardley further concedes that the
discipline was proportionate to his misconduct. Aplt. Brf. at 30. Yardley takes exception
only with the three conclusions summarized above, basing his argument on Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) and -16(4)(h)(iii). These subsections provide that this Court shall
grant relief only if it determines that Yardley has been substantially prejudiced by final
agency action where the agency "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law"
(subsection 63-46b-16(4)(d)) or if the agency action is "contrary to the agency's prior
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practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency" (subsection 63-46b16(4)(h)(iii)).

A.

CSRB correctly determined that the Department did not act
inconsistently with its prior practice because Yardley failed
to make a prima facie showing of inconsistency
Yardley first contends that the Department acted inconsistently with its prior

practice in terminating his employment because the Department did not similarly
discipline employees about whom rumors of workplace affairs had circulated. Yardley's
argument fails because he applies an incorrect test for showing inconsistency.
This Court has held that a party asserting inconsistent agency action has the
burden of making a prima facie showing of inconsistency. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil
Serv. Comm.. 2000 UT App 235, ^[13, 8 P.3d 1048. Inconsistent treatment "can only be
found when similarfactual circumstances led to a different result without explanation."
Id at % 14 (emphasis added). If a party makes a showing of inconsistent treatment by a
preponderance of the evidence, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the agency to
explain its rationale for the inconsistency. Id. This Court's review of that explanation
will be for reasonableness and rationality. Id. Here, the burden of persuasion never
shifted to the Department to offer an explanation, because Yardley never demonstrated a
prima facie inconsistency in similar factual circumstances.
Rather, Yardley put on evidence in the step 5 hearing that rumors of off-duty coworker affairs were treated differently than Yardley's on-duty and off-duty sexual
misconduct. Yardley now concedes that a rumor of a workplace affair is dissimilar to his
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own videotaped misconduct, yet nevertheless should be considered a similar factual
circumstance merely because it raises the same concerns as his own misconduct. Aplt.
Brf. at 32-33. However, this argument improperly expands the test in Kelly for
determining inconsistency. Only similar factual circumstances are relevant, not dissimilar
factual circumstances which may raise the same concerns. The holding in Kelly does not
intimate that dissimilar conduct raising the same concerns can support a showing of
inconsistency nor does Yardley cite any authority for his expanded reading of Kelly.
Thus, Yardley's argument fails by his own concession that the conduct is dissimilar.
Moreover, Yardley fails to demonstrate that a rumor of an off-duty workplace
affair raises all of the same concerns as Yardley's on-duty misconduct. CSRB correctly
noted that Yardley's on-duty masturbation actually prevented him from fulfilling his
guard duties, a different and additional concern from the general negative impact upon the
workplace potentially caused by a rumor of an affair.
Because Yardley's argument is based on an incorrect standard unsupported by case
law, it should be rejected. Because rumors of workplace affairs constituted conduct
factually dissimilar to Yardley's videotaped misconduct, CSRB correctly determined that
Yardley never established a prima facie showing of inconsistency and thus the burden of
persuasion never shifted to the Department to explain any inconsistency. Kelly. 2000 UT
App at f 13. Accordingly, CSRB's conclusion is reasonable and rational and should be
affirmed.
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B.

CSRB correctly found no due process deprivation where Yardley was
given notice of the allegations against him and an opportunity to be
heard prior to his termination
Yardley next argues that he was deprived of due process because a complete

investigation was not conducted nor were committee reviews used prior to the filing of
the second administrative complaint. However, Yardley's argument fails because it
would create additional due process requirements that are not supported by authority.
The Department's statutory due process requirements were met in this case before
Yardley's termination. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) sets forth those requirements: "A
career employee may not be . . . dismissed unless . . . the department head or designated
representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal... [and]
the employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department head or designated
representative." Following this hearing, the employee may be dismissed "if the
department head finds adequate cause or reason." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(e).
These statutory requirements are consistent with Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv.
Comm., 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), where this Court held that a terminated
employee was afforded due process where he (1) received written notice of the charges
against him and (2) had a pretermination opportunity to respond to the charges.
Both requirements were met in this case. Prior to the step 4 hearing, Yardley
received written notice of the allegations against him in the form of the amended
administrative complaint. R. 350-52. At the hearing, Yardley called witnesses,
introduced documentary evidence, and made closing arguments. R. 384. Yardley was
also represented by counsel. R. 384. Because the statutory requirements of due process
were met by this pretermination hearing, Yardley cannot claim that any other error
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predating the hearing deprived him of due process. Because Yardley does not challenge
that he was notified in writing of the allegations against him or that he was able to
respond to the allegations at a pretermination hearing, he has in effect conceded that the
statutory due process requirements were met.
Instead of addressing these statutory requirements, Yardley argues without
supporting authority that the pretermination hearing did not satisfy due process because it
did not functionally serve the purpose of the committee review process. This argument
misstates the due process requirements and creates an additional requirement unsupported
by authority. In any event, the pretermination hearing did serve the purpose of a
committee review, because the Department's ALJ reviewed the very issues Yardley
claims would have been assessed in the committee review: Yardley's personnel file
(R. 354); the prior discipline imposed in March 2001 (R.354, f2); and mitigating and
aggravating factors (R. 364). Yardley asserts he was materially harmed by the
Department's failure to use committee reviews. Yet he fails to explain how we was
harmed. Accordingly, Yardley suffered no due process violation.
Yardley's assertion that the lack of committee reviews was a constitutional
violation that caused harm and his assertion that the Department was required by law to
conduct a meaningful investigation are conclusory arguments made without authority and
should be summarily rejected. See Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (stating that this Court will not consider conclusory arguments without
citation to authority); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring arguments to be supported with
citation to authority relied upon). Likewise, Yardley's argument that the investigation
should have implicitly been meaningful and that a non-meaningful investigation violates
due process are also made without supporting authority and should be rejected. In
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addition, Yardley's argument regarding perceived inadequacies in the second
investigation is really a challenge to the CSRB's factual finding that the investigation
began and ended with the viewing of the videotape. Because Yardley has failed to
marshal the evidence, he cannot challenge this factual finding. See Road Runner Oil Inc.
v. Bd. of Oil Gas and Mining, 2003 UT App 275, ^[10, 76 P.3d 692 (requiring party
challenging sufficiency of the evidence to marshal the evidence). In any event, any
perceived irregularities with the investigation or the committee review process were cured
when Yardley was given notice of the allegations against him and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before his termination.
CSRB correctly concluded that Yardley was not deprived of due process because
he was given notice of the allegations against him and an opportunity to be heard at a
pretermination hearing. Because Yardley has not demonstrated a due process violation
CSRB's conclusion is reasonable and rational and should be affirmed.

C.

CSRB correctly determined that the prior warning did not prevent the
Department from terminating Yardley because it only referred to
future conduct and not the prior, previously undiscovered
misconduct for which Yardley was terminated
Finally, Yardley argues that the prior warning precluded his termination because it

was in effect a promise that the Department would not take disciplinary action for
previously occurring misconduct similar to that for which he was given the suspension.
This argument fails because CSRB's contrary interpretation that the Department was not
bound by the language of the warning is reasonable and rational. It is Yardley's
interpretation, not the CSRB's, which is unreasonable and irrational.
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CSRB concluded that the misconduct supporting termination was so much more
egregious and "troubling" than the misconduct supporting the 15-day suspension that it
could not be considered the "same type" of conduct. R. 567-71. Yardley's 15-day
suspension came for masturbating at least once in the guard tower and for videotaping
himself and his wife having intercourse, after which the videos were somehow circulated
to Department employees. Yardley was terminated, however, for multiple incidents of
videotaped masturbation, both on and off duty, including masturbating in public places,
which CSRB correctly noted could constitute violations of Utah law. R. 567. Yardley
was also terminated for displaying his work phone number to solicit sexually oriented
phone calls, displaying the names of women on his penis while he masturbated, and
removing his clothing to masturbate naked in the guard tower. Because the conduct
supporting termination is significantly more egregious than the conduct supporting the
15-day suspension, both in nature and number, and because this more serious misconduct
was unknown to the Department at the time of the suspension, CSRB reasonably and
rationally concluded that it was conduct of a different type. Particularly given the
criminal implications of Yardley's public masturbation, the misconduct supporting
termination is sufficiently more serious from a public safety standpoint. Accordingly,
CSRB acted reasonably and rationally when it labeled the more serious misconduct as
categorically different from the conduct supporting the 15-day suspension. Yardley's
interpretation of the warning and the nature of the misconduct, on the other hand, is
t/wreasonable because it would give him carte blanche immunity for substantial
misconduct committed prior to the first administrative complaint.
Yardley's interpretation of the warning language is further unreasonable in that it
overlooks the warning's application to future conduct only. Because the warning only
22
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referred to future misconduct, it did not bind the Department with respect to any of
Yardley's previous misconduct. The first administrative complaint stated: "You are
hereby warned that should this type of misconduct reoccur in the future, we will be forced
to consider severe disciplinary sanctions, including termination." R. 345. Two qualifiers
are used for misconduct - "type" and "future." The warning on its face only addresses
misconduct which is both of the same type and occurring in the future. By its
grammatical construction, it says nothing of dissimilar misconduct, past or future. And it
says nothing of past conduct, similar or dissimilar. The substance of the first
administrative complaint itself did deal with past conduct, but the precise warning
language relied upon by Yardley says nothing of undiscovered past conduct, similar or
dissimilar to the misconduct in the first complaint.
Yardley's interpretation of the warning is unreasonable because it unduly focuses
on the modifier "type," while ignoring "future." Yardley's analysis additionally
overlooks the word "warned." Warn means "[to] make aware in advance of actual or
potential harm, danger, or evil"; "to admonish as to action or manners"; "[t]o notify (a
person) to go or stay away"; or "[t]o notify or apprise in advance" AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY

(4th Ed. 2000, online at http://www.bartleby.com/61/27AV0032700.html)

(emphasis added). When viewed in its entirety, the warning language objectively limits
itself to future conduct only. Because the misconduct relied upon to terminate Yardley
predated the first administrative complaint, the warning language did not preclude the
Department from terminating Yardley for that misconduct. Because the warning
language thus makes no promise regarding past misconduct which at the time was
undiscovered, the CSRB was not unreasonable or irrational in concluding that the prior
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warning had no binding effect on the Department in relation to the previously occurring
misconduct.

Conclusion
This Court should dismiss Yardley's petition with prejudice because Yardley's
failure to make CSRB a party to this action deprives this Court of jurisdiction under
UAPA. Yardley has never named CSRB as a party in this proceeding, he has not listed
CSRB as an additional non-captioned party in his brief as required by Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(1), nor has he served CSRB with a copy of his opening brief. His failure to perfect
his appeal at this stage of the proceedings warrants dismissal.
Even if this Court has jurisdiction over this controvery, the CSRB's decision
should be affirmed because it was reasonable and rational. The CSRB correctly upheld
Yardley's termination in all three aspects challenged by Yardley. First, CSRB correctly
determined that the Department did not act inconsistently with its prior practice in
terminating Yardley because he failed to make a prima facie showing of any
inconsistency. Second, Yardley was not deprived of due process because, prior to his
termination, he was given notice of the allegations against him and an opportunity to be
heard. And, third, CSRB correctly concluded that a prior warning given to Yardley did
not prevent the Department from terminating Yardley because the prior warning only
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referred to future conduct and not to the prior, previously undiscovered misconduct for
which Yardley was terminated.
Dated this /J?

clay of August, 2005

J. GLIFFORDy^ETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Department of Corrections

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Thi? is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT to the following this _2^1*3ay of August, 2005:
Blake Nakamura
Attorney for Kevin Yardley
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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7. Jurisdiction
Agency has jurisdiction to act on motion for
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McCoy v Utah Disaster
Kleenup, 2003, 65 P 3d 643, 467 Utah Adv. Rep.
23, 2003 UT App 49. Administrative Law And
Procedure G3 483
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have denied a motion not ruled upon within 20
days of submission did not apply to motion for
reconsideration, and thus, Commission had jurisdiction to grant, four months after the motion
was submitted, Collection Division's petition for
reconsideration of Commission's final decision
dismissing taxpayer from assessment action.
U.CJU953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Prince v. Collection Div. of State Tax Com'n, 1999, 974 P.2d
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§63-46b-14
8. Appeal
Where State Tax Commission issued order on
taxpayer's reconsideration request on January
15, taxpayer's appeal filed on February 12 was
timely, despite Commission's claim that motion
for reconsideration had been deemed denied
more than 30 days earlier. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3Xa). Knowledge
Data Systems v. Utah State Tax Com'n Auditing
Div., 1993, 865 P.2d 1387. Taxation &* 1319
Appeal from order of Tax Commission filed
within 30 days of Tax Commission's denial of
petition for reconsideration was timely, even
though it was more than 30 days after the
petition was deemed denied by virtue of Commission's failure to make a timely ruling.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Orton v. Utah
State Tax Com'n, Collection Div., 1993, 864
P.2d904. Taxation «=» 493.3

§ 63-46b-14. Judicial review—Exhaustion of administrative remedies
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement
to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action
is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13
(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 270; Laws 1988, c. 72, § 24.
Cross References
Division of Facilities Construction and Management, dispute resolution process, see § 63A-5-208.
Library References
Administrative Law and Procedure <&»662,
722
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 15Ak662;
15Ak722

CJ.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure§§ 185,204,209.
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§63-46b-16

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Court of Appeals examines appeal from lower
court's review of administrative decision as if
appeal had come directly from agency; Court of
Appeals need not defer to lower court's findings
and conclusions. Matter of License of Topik,
1988, 761 P.2d 32, certiorari denied 773 P.2d
45. Administrative Law And Procedure <£=> 683

In reviewing administrative agency's interpretation of general law, Court of Appeals applies
correction of error standard of review, giving
no deference to agency's interpretation. Matter
of License of Topi, 1988, 761 P.2d 32, certiorari denied 773 P.2d 45. Administrative Law And
Procedure $=> 796

§ 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 . Judicial review—Formal adjudicative proceedings
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies
for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
533

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§63-46b-16
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(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies
the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 272; Laws 1988, c. 72, § 26.
Cross References
Taxation, additional district court jurisdiction, see § 59-1-601.
Library References
Administrative Law and Procedure <S»676,
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Proce725, 754 to 765.
dure §§ 197, 206, 212, 218 to 219, 223 to
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 15Ak676;
225, 244.
15Ak725; 15Ak754 to 15Ak765.
Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Accountant's Liability § 10:2.6, Appeals.
United States Supreme Court
Ripeness doctrine, judicial review of adReview of agency decisions,
ministrative actions, evaluation of fitIn general,
ness of issues and hardship to parties,
Administrative agencies, level of deferexceptions, see National Park Hospitalence required for tariff classification
ity Association v. Department of the
ruling, see United States v. Mead CorInterior, U.S.D.C2003, 123 S.Ct. 2026,
poration, U.S.2001, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 533
538 U.S. 803.
U.S. 218.
Agency interpretation,
Final agency action, environmental proJudicial deference to agency construction
tection, revisions to national ambient
of regulations, applicability of federal
air quality standards, delegation of legregulations to railroad warning devices
islative power, see Whitman v. Ameriinstalled with federal funds, adminiscan Trucking Associations, Inc.,
trative law, see Norfolk Southern RailU.S.Dist.Col.2001, 121 S.Ct. 903, 531
way Company v. Shanklin, U.S.Tenn.
U.S. 457.
2000, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 529 U.S. 156.
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113.
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mand 2 F.3d 1161.
106, 124L.Ed.2d21.

In general 1
Abuse of discretion 27
Application for rehearing 7
Arbitrary or capricious action 25
Collateral order doctrine 11
Complete review of record 30

Notes of Decisions
Consistency of agency action 26
Contrary to rule of agency 23
Correction of error 19
Cross-appeal 42
De novo review 22
Dismissal 43
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